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Articles

The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in
International Litigation
GEORGE A. BERMANN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Of the various forms of provisional relief in the context of international litigation, none has sparked as much interest and controversy
as the international anti-suit injunction. In many ways the international anti-suit injunction, an instrument by which a court of one
jurisdiction seeks to restrain the conduct of litigation in another jurisdiction, resembles more conventional forms of international provisional relief such as the foreign attachment or preliminary injunction.
Like them, the anti-suit injunction affords courts an important opportunity to affect the course and significance of litigation abroad. However, such intervention strongly implies-and often actually createsjurisdictional conflict rather than the jurisdictional cooperation often
associated with the notion of provisional relief in domestic and international litigation alike. That anti-suit injunctions are addressed to
private persons within the jurisdiction of the enjoining court (operating against them in personam), rather than directly to the foreign
court whose proceedings are at issue, does not substantially lessen the
element of conflict. 1
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This article is the development of a talk delivered at a panel discussion sponsored by the American Foreign Law Association on the occasion of the International Law Association's 1989 annual International Law
Weekend held at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
1. American courts have generally refused to distinguish between addressing an injunction to parties before a court and addressing an injunction to the court itself. Donovan v.
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964); Central National Bank of Boston v. Stevens, 169 U.S. 432,
460 (1898); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849); Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S.
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The sensitivity of the anti-suit injunction in international practice
arises more out of its anti-suit than its injunctive aspect. Generally
speaking, American courts do not consider it improper to order a person subject to their personal jurisdiction to perform, or refrain from
performing, a specified act outside the forum, provided they have a
sufficient interest in the performance of that act and intervention is
warranted. In certain settings, to be sure, the issuance of international injunctive relief by American courts has generated particularly
strong protest by foreign governments and by the private interests
adversely affected. One such setting is the order to produce evidence
located abroad for use in American litigation, a matter that remains
controversial despite an international treaty2 and a recent Supreme
Court ruling on the subject.3 Another much-criticized use of the
international injunction is the order to cease certain overseas practices
that, while lawful where performed, are deemed to affect adversely
important American regulatory interests.
Nevertheless, there is something singularly problematic about
injunctions prohibiting the commencement or continuation of foreign
judicial proceedings. Although the Laker litigation of several years
ago brought the international anti-suit injunction into view as never
before,' this instrument's scope of application and its capacity for mischief in international litigation are still greatly underestimated. This
article seeks to put the problem in new perspective by viewing the
international anti-suit injunction against the background of analogous
interstate practice and explicitly considering the relevant policy differences raised by the international element. Accordingly, upon relating
1105 (1982); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1972). For another
view drawing such a distinction, see Cole v. Cinningham, 133 U.S. 107, 121 (1890); Natalbany
Lumber Co. v. McGraw, 188 La. 863, 871, 178 So. 377, 379 (1938); Labak v. Graznar, 54 Ohio
App. 191, 193-94, 6 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1935); State ex rel. R.R. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 767,
55 S.W.2d 272, 273 (1932); Note, EnjoiningSuits in Foreign Jurisdictions,17 COLUM. L. REv.
328 (1917).
2. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1973,
23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 744.
3. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987). See Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme Court A Critique of the Adrospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REv. 525

(1989).
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 415, comment a (1987).

5. See, e.g., Hartley, Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctionsin InternationalLitigation, 35 AM. J. COMp. L. 487 (1987); Note, Antisuit Injunctions and InternationalComity, 71
VA. L. REv. 1039 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Antisuit Injunctions]; Note, InjunctionsAgainst the
Prosecution of Litigation Abroad: Towards a TransnationalApproach, 37 STAN. L. REV. 155

(1984) [hereinafter Note, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad]. Most
American commentators have been highly critical, on comity grounds, of the international
anti-suit injunction.
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the Laker case as a paradigm of the international anti-suit injunction
(part II), it looks to the domestic cases, and the principles of constitutional and judicial policy that appear to govern them, as background
against which to measure the problem in its international guise (part
III). After considering the international anti-suit injunction in both
constitutional and non-constitutional light (parts IV and V), the balance of the article (part VI) differentiates among the three principal
objectives served by the anti-suit injunction in the international context and suggests the outlines of a judicial policy best suited to each.
II. THE LAKER LITIGATION
Laker Airways was a small British airline that in the 1970's had
introduced a low-fare transatlantic charter service, acquiring at the
height of its business one-seventh of that market. Not long thereafter,
however, price competition from the more established airlines, coupled with Laker's difficulties in financing its operations, forced the
company into liquidation. Through its liquidators, Laker instituted
an antitrust action in federal district court in Washington, D.C.
against several international airlines, its aircraft supplier (McDonnell
Douglas) and the supplier's financial affiliate (McDonnell Douglas
Finance Corporation). Laker charged that the airline defendants had
conducted a campaign of predatory pricing designed to put Laker out
of business and, to that end, had enlisted the cooperation of McDonnell Douglas and the McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, as
well as Laker's own lender, Midland Bank, which was not sued.
Laker sought treble damages in excess of one billion dollars.6
Even before having been brought into the litigation, Midland
Bank took the precaution of applying to the English High Court for
an anti-suit injunction barring Laker from joining it as a defendant.
After the bank obtained the relief sought,7 several of the airline
defendants applied in the same court for still fuller relief. They
sought, in addition to an injunction halting the American proceedings
pending against them, both a declaration that they had not engaged in
any unlawful conspiracy and a "counter-anti-suit injunction," an
6. The American litigation, is reported in the following decisions: Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Laker Airways v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984); Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways,
596 F. Supp. 202 (D.D.C. 1984); Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 577 F. Supp. 348
(D.D.C. 1983); Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1983);
Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983).
7. The circumstances of Midland's successful application in the High Court are
recounted in Midland Bank pic. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1986] 1 All E.R. 526, 528, 530 (Lawton, L.J.) (C.A. 1985).
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order barring Laker from seeking an anti-suit injunction in the United
States directed at the English proceedings. Though the English High
Court temporarily granted the injunctions, it later denied permanent
relief.8 On appeal, injunctive relief was awarded by the Court of
Appeal,9 only to be later vacated on further appeal by the House of
Lords.10
While the British anti-suit litigation was still in its early stages,
Laker sought an order from the American court barring the other
defendants from obtaining anti-suit injunctions or counter-anti-suit
injunctions in England. The application was successful,1 1 and the district court's grant of relief was sustained on appeal. 12 It was only
after the Courts of Appeal of the two jurisdictions had reached an
apparent stalemate1 3 that the House of Lords issued its order vacating
the English injunction. According to the Lords, the business conduct
of the airlines reasonably subjected them to the prescriptive antitrust
jurisdiction of the United States, and Laker's American lawsuit could
not therefore be deemed an "unconscionable" exercise in extraterritoriality, as the English Court of Appeal in ordering the injunctive relief
had found it to be. 14 Eventually the antitrust suit was settled, with
Sir Freddie Laker taking home a substantial sum of money.15
Although the particular jurisdictional confrontation in Laker
8. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] 1 Q.B. 142 (C.A. 1983).
9. Id. at 169. The Court of Appeal explained its reversal of the High Court ruling as
required by an intervening order of the British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
prohibiting the production of documents for use in the American action. That order was
issued pursuant to the British blocking statute, the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980,
ch. 11, and was cited by the Court of Appeal as disabling the applicants from adequately
defending themselves in the American action. See Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Antitrust Measures) Order 1983 (June 27, 1983), reproducedin British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] 1 Q.1B. 169, 195 (C.A. 1983).
10. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1985] A.C. 58 (1984).
11. 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983).
12. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
13. When it appeared that an impasse had been reached and that the British injunction
might stand, the District Court appointed an amicus curiae specifically to advise the court on
how to proceed. 577 F. Supp. 348, 355-56 (D.D.C. 1983). For the report of the amicus curiae,
see Pollak, Report of Amicus Curiae, 23 INT'L LEG. MAT. 598 (1984). The report suggested
that a person outside the jurisdiction of the English courts and immune from any anti-suit
injunction the courts might issue be appointed trustee or receiver to continue the action on
Laker's behalf.
14. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1985] A.C. 58, 84 (Diplock, L. J.), 95-96
(Scarman, L. J.) (1984). The Lords not only vacated the injunction, but also held that the
English courts are without jurisdiction to resolve questions of liability under American antitrust law.
15. Laker Suit Settled for $60 Million, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1985, at C3, col. 4. Sir Freddie Laker, founder of the airline, subsequently retired from the airline business, setting up an
aviation consulting practice in the Bahamas. Freddie Laker at Slower Speed, New York
Times, Oct. 4, 1987, § 3, at 12, col. 3.
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was resolved, 16 the prospects for future confrontation were not. Mid-

land Bank, whose anti-suit injunction against Laker had been vacated
by the High Court in the wake of the House of Lords ruling in
Laker,1 7 subsequently succeeded in having the injunction reinstated
by the English Court of Appeal on the ground that pursuit of an

American antitrust action against it would be "unconscionable."'

8

Midland in fact never became a defendant in the American action.

Although one cannot be entirely sure what role the British order
played in shielding Midland from suit in the United States, the ruling

showed that the prospect of further interjurisdictional impasse was
not to be dismissed. All in all, the protracted Laker litigation left
observers puzzled and disturbed by the vast anti-suit and counteranti-suit injunction possibilities.
III.

THE INTERSTATE BACKGROUND OF THE ANTI-SUIT
INJUNCTION

It is understandably tempting to begin any analysis of the anti-

suit injunction with cases like Laker that place the practice in its highstakes transnational setting. But though such cases doubtless have
given the problem much of its currency, the fact remains that
interjurisdictional injunctions were not invented for international
cases alone. In fact, until relatively recently, American courts rarely

exercised the power to restrain proceedings in the courts of foreign
nations. On the other hand, the anti-suit injunction has long been a
feature of what might be called sister-state interjurisdictional practice.
The anti-suit injunction has deep roots in English law.' 9 Traceable at least to fifteenth-century England, the remedy first appeared in
the form of a writ of prohibition by the common law courts to the
ecclesiastical courts to prevent their expansive jurisdictional assertions.20 Later, the Court of Chancery invoked the remedy as a means
16. Even following the House of Lords decision, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction barring the airlines from again asking the British courts to interfere with the American proceedings. Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 596 F. Supp. 202, 204 (D.D.C.
1984). However, the court later declined to restrain the airlines from resorting to the British
executive and legislative authorities. Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 604 F. Supp.
280, 294 (D.D.C. 1984).
17. On the strength of Laker, Judge Leggatt discharged the anti-suit injunction and
struck the bank's claim for a declaration of non-liability undei American law.
18. [1986] 1 All E.R. 526 (C.A.). Although it reinstated the anti-suit injunction, the
Court of Appeal nevertheless dismissed Midland's request for a declaration of non-liability
under English law.
19. See generally Hartley, supra note 5; Note, supra note 1.
20. Lord Coke, as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, strongly defended the
right of the common law courts to address writs of prohibition to the ecclesiastical courts. See,
e.g., Langdale's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1338 (K.B. 1609). See also Fuller's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
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of preventing a party from bringing suit in the common law courts
under circumstances in which doing so would be considered contrary
to good conscience.2 1 Though initially directed at proceedings in
other English courts, the anti-suit injunction eventually was extended

to proceedings in foreign countries. It is in that very different arena
that the remedy is now most commonly deployed by English courts.
Considering the anti-suit injunction's origins and evolution in Great
Britain, the Laker case was thus an especially appropriate occasion
for bringing renewed attention to the remedy in the United States.
A.

The Domestic Anti-Suit Injunction Cases

As mentioned, anti-suit injunctions have long been an accepted
feature of sister-state practice,22 and their issuance or nonissuance has
given rise to abundant case law. Upon examination, the sister-state
cases involving anti-suit injunctions show three striking features.
First, issuance of such an injunction appears to require rather little by
way of legal preconditions. Legally, the stage is set when parallel proceedings involving the same parties and the same issues are pending

or contemplated in different fora, and the party seeking relief from the
out-of-state action can demonstrate that serious and irreparable harm
would actually flow from its maintenance.2 3 Second, notwithstanding
the frequent admonition that courts should not lightly interfere with
judicial proceedings in the courts of a sister state,2 4 over the years a
1322, 1323 (K.B. 1607). See generally Dumbauld, Judicial Interference with Litigation in
Other Courts, 74 DICK. L. REv. 369, 375-78 (1969).
21. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 489.
22. Pound said of the interjurisdictional anti-suit injunction: "Undoubtedly a state may
coerce its citizens not to sue abroad. It does not follow, however, that its courts of equity...
ought to exercise such jurisdiction in every case where it exists. We have to ask: What are the
legal rights of the plaintiff in equity, defendant abroad, and are the legal remedies which are
open to him adequate to maintain those rights? We have then to ask, is the injustice and
hardship upon the plaintiff such as to make it expedient for equity to act, in view of the delicate
considerations involved in interference with legal proceedings in other states?" Pound, The
Progressof the Law, 33 HARv. L. RFv. 420, 426 (1920).
23. Some courts have required that the allegedly offensive foreign action already have
been instituted in order for the injunctive claim to be ripe. See Note, When Courts of Equity
Will Enjoin Foreign Suits, 27 IOWA L. REv. 76, 85 (1942).
24. E.g., McWhorter v. Williams, 228 Ala. 632, 633, 155 So. 309, 310 (1934); Johnson v.
Johnson, 146 Misc. 93, 95, 261 N.Y. Supp. 523, 526 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Delaware L. & W.R.R. v.
Ashelman, 300 Pa. 291, 295, 150 A. 475, 476 (1930); Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 182
Ky. 455, 465, 206 S.W. 794, 798 (1918); J.W. Wells Lumber Co. v. Menominee River Boom
Co., 203 Mich. 14, 30, 168 N.W. 1011, 1016 (1918); American Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn.
489, 492, 187 S.W. 1117, 1118 (1916); Wade v. Crump, 173 S.W. 538, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915); United Board & Carton Corp. v. Beuerlein, 35 N.J. 343, 173 A.2d 225 (1961). Countless such decisions hold that convenience or preference to be sued in a given jurisdiction will
not ordinarily enable the defendant to enjoin the plaintiff from proceeding in others. Note,
supra note 1, at 329.
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large number of anti-suit injunctions have been directed against proceedings in sister-state courts.25 Third, the sister-state cases reveal a
considerable variety in the uses to which injunctive relief of this sort is
put and in the special circumstances said to justify them. Basically,
anti-suit injunctions have been ordered or affirmed when the enjoining
jurisdiction considers the out-of-state action to be (1) highly inconvenient, vexatious or oppressive (generally to a local party), (2) in violation of a prior and independent obligation not to sue, or (3) a threat to
the enjoining court's own jurisdiction or otherwise contrary to local
public policy. 26 Under these broad rubrics, American courts have
offered equitable relief in the form of anti-suit injunctions in a wide
range of different situations.
Perhaps the most frequent reason courts give for enjoining the
prosecution of a suit in a sister-state court is the desire to protect local
residents from the hardship of inconvenient, vexatious or oppressive
litigation. That a party would rather not be sued, or believes it has a
meritorious defense, should not of course by itself entitle it to have the
proceedings effectively enjoined by a different court. Similarly, that a
party would prefer suit to take place, if at all, in a different court does
not without more entitle it to have that court effectively oust the
forum of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, parties have been remarkably
successful in persuading judges to restrain proceedings in sister-state
courts by showing that under the circumstances those proceedings
were unreasonably inconvenient, vexatious or oppressive. 27 The sister-state cases involving disagreement over the fairness and reasonableness of the plaintiff's choice of forum present the jurisdictional
conflict in its plainest terms. When either the enjoining or targeted
jurisdiction is a federal court, however, the rules governing the propriety of interjurisdictional anti-suit injunctions obey somewhat different
principles and assume additional refinements which exceed the scope
of this inquiry.28
Quite clearly, what one party considers resort to legitimate
25. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Clem, 36 F.
Supp. 703 (N.D. W. Va. 1941); Pitcairn v. Drummond, 216 Ind. 54, 23 N.E.2d 21 (1939);
Oates v. Morningside Coll., 217 Iowa 1059, 252 N.W. 783 (1934); Boston & M.R.R. v. Whitehead, 307 Mass. 106, 29 N.E.2d 916 (1940); Marquis v. Marquis, 121 N.J. Eq. 288, 189 A. 388
(Ct. Errors and App. 1937); Labak v. Graznar, 54 Ohio App. 191, 6 N.E.2d 790 (1935).
26. See generally Note, supra note 23, at 86-104.
27. Eg., Commercial Acetylene Co. v. Avery Lighting Co., 152 F. 642 (1906), aff'd, 159
F. 935 (7th Cir. 1908); Gordon v. Munn, 81 Kan. 537, 106 P. 286 (1910); Locomobile Co. v.
American Bridge Co., 80 App. Div. 44, 80 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1903). See generally Note, supra
note 23, at 83-84.
28. See generally Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and FederalCourts, 32
U. CHI. L. Rnv. 471 (1965).
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litigation advantages of an out-of-state forum may strike the other as
an exercise in inconvenience, vexatiousness and oppression. Equally
clear, while courts have developed some useful rules for deciding
when recourse to a sister-state court is or is not abusive, 29 none has
devised a test that would neatly distinguish the two situations in all
cases. Many courts, particularly in the older cases, appear to be on
the lookout for evidence of fraud or collusion in resort to the chosen
forum,3° or for an actual intent to cause undue hardship to the
defendant, 31 but the subjectivity of these conditions makes the inquiry
difficult. In addition, these labels have a highly conclusory quality
and do not seem better able than any other factor to explain the
results.
A second category of cases in which courts have sought to
restrain judicial proceedings in sister states is characterized by the
existence of some prior and independent obligation not to sue of
which the sister-state proceedings allegedly represent a breach. This
is a category of cases that, while not figuring prominently in the sisterstate context, assumes greater proportions in the international cases.32
The difference may be owed to an expectation on the part of defendants in state courts, not shared by defendants in foreign country
courts, that the forum can be relied upon with reasonable promptness
and objectivity to give effect to the obligation not to sue, and that
another court's intervention is simply not necessary.33 It may be due
in part, too, to the greater incidence of arbitration and choice-offorum clauses in international transactions.
Least well defined is the class of cases in which the enjoining
court regards the out-of-state proceedings as a threat to its own jurisdiction or to some other paramount consideration of public policy.
29. Courts have said that the availability in the sister-state court selected of more advantageous rules of evidence or of a more favorable body of law on the merits of a dispute is not a
proper ground for enjoining conduct of the foreign proceedings. Edgell v. Clarke, 19 App.
Div. 199, 45 N.Y. Supp. 979 (1897); Carson v. Durham, 149 Mass. 52, 20 N.E. 312 (1889).
30. Fraud has been found when the entire lawsuit appears to be part of a scheme to
defraud and, more narrowly, when fraud has been practiced in order to come within the subject matter or personal jurisdiction of the court. For a discussion and illustrations, see Note,
supra note 23, at 87-91.
31. Generally speaking, the party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that institution of the principal proceedings abroad was motivated by a desire to injure the defendant
rather than to obtain a legitimate litigation advantage. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 256 App. Div. 756, 760, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 768, 772 (1939); Bankers Life Co. v. Loring, 217
Iowa 534, 544, 250 N.W. 8, 13 (1933).
32. See infra notes 119-27, and accompanying text.
33. Defendants probably assume, and rightly so, that state courts may not be as receptive
to the idea that litigation pending before them is so inconvenient, vexatious or oppressive to
the defendant as to require dismissal on forum non conveniens or some other discretionary
ground.
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The older cases of this sort are populated with gambling statutes,
grounds for divorce, policies against obtaining preferences from an
insolvent debtor, garnishment of exempt wages and the administration of decedents' estates.34 The public policy category also, and more
questionably, includes claims that the out-of-state forum simply will
apply to a given dispute a body of law that is substantially less
favorable to the defendant in that action than the law that would be
applied by the court asked to intervene.3 5 American courts have also

wrestled with the claim that certain statutory causes of action may
only be brought in the jurisdiction that created them and that an
injunction may therefore issue to enjoin their prosecution elsewhere.36
They may react similarly to the assertion by a sister-state court of

personal jurisdiction over one of their domiciliaries under circumstances suggesting a violation of due process. 37 A related claim,

rarely heard in the sister-state context but not at all unlikely to surface in the international setting, is that the out-of-state tribunal is not
willing or able to afford a fair hearing or to accord full and adequate
38

relief.
Although the typology set out covers virtually all cases in which
anti-suit injunctions may plausibly be sought, some cases do not fall
neatly into any one category to the exclusion of the others. At the
34. E.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 481, 71
A. 153, 163 (Prerog. Ct. 1908); Kelly v. Siefert, 71 Mo. App. 143, 147 (1897); Sandage v.
Studebaker Co., 142 Ind. 148, 153, 41 N.E. 380, 381 (1895); Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203, 206
(1877); Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N.C. 261, 264, 59 S.E. 58, 59 (1907). See generallyNote, supra
note 23, at 92-94.
35. Note, supra note 23, at 94-95.
36. Id. However, the Supreme Court has held that "a State cannot create a transitory
cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action
in any court having jurisdiction." Accordingly, a state need not give full faith and credit to a
provision of law of another state creating a transitory cause of action that purports to bar the
courts of any other state from entertaining it. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
Nevertheless, that a state need not respect restrictions of venue built into sister-state transitory
causes of action will not necessarily prevent the state enacting those restrictions from enjoining
persons within its jurisdiction from bringing those causes of action elsewhere. See Wabash Ry.
v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W. 523 (1919). For the view that restrictive venue statutes
by themselves and without special circumstances do not justify interference with sister-state
proceedings, see Note, supra note 23, at 98-99.
37. Such a claim would not ordinarily justify issuance of an anti-suit injunction because
the forum, particularly through its appellate levels, is capable of correcting the error if any and
obligated to do so. The United States Supreme Court is also a potential appellate forum on the
jurisdictional issue. On essentially the same logic, the Supreme Court has held that parties
that have had an opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the rendering court in that court
and on appeal, may not ask a sister-state court to deny recognition to the resulting judgment
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S.
522, 524-525 (1931). Cf. Trainies v. Sunshine Min. Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
38. For such a claim in the sister-state context, see Monumental Savings Ass'n v. Fentress, 125 F. 812 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1903).
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same time, some cases raise distinctive issues that the categories do
not adequately capture. The case of Stevens v. Frick 39 provides a
good example. The plaintiff there had brought suit in a Pennsylvania
state court against a well-known historian for the alleged defamation
in one of his books on Pennsylvania history of her father, a wealthy
nineteenth-century industrialist. ° This suit for a permanent injunction barring the book's sale and distribution eventually failed on several grounds. 4 1 Before decision, however, and at the urging of the
American Historical Association and Organization of American Historians, the defendant filed suit in federal court seeking to bar the
plaintiff from continuing the defamation action on the ground that it
chilled the exercise of constitutionally protected federal rights of free
expression. Although that action raised serious issues, it ultimately
failed both in district court and on appeal, on account of the courts'
reluctance, except in highly special circumstances, to interfere with
proceedings in another jurisdiction.4 2 The interest of the case, however, lies in its illustration of all three anti-suit injunction grounds.
The defendant in the defamation suit described the action as inconvenient and vexatious; he portrayed the plaintiff (and the state judge) as
under a prior and overriding obligation to respect his First Amendment rights; and he asserted the strong public interest of the court
(sitting in New York, the publisher's principal place of business) in
Despite the
not permitting the defamation action to proceed.'
39. 259 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 372 F. 2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 920 (1967).
40. The book, Pennsylvania: Birthplace of the Nation, allegedly portrayed the plaintiff's
father falsely as an enemy of labor.
41. The state court ruled for the defendant on several grounds, including the non-survival of defamation claims and the non-applicability of Pennsylvania's statute on the survival
of actions, and the essential truth of the representations. Frick v. Stevens, 43 Pa. D. & C. 2d 6,
43, 47 (C.P. Cumb. Co. 1967).
42. Stevens v. Frick, 259 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 372 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 920 (1967). The state court decision in favor of the defendant was
rendered three days after the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.
The outcome was doubtless also influenced by the federal court's special reluctance to
interfere with a state court proceeding. Stevens v. Frick, 372 F. 2d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 1967),
aff'g Stevens v. Frick, 259 F. Supp. 654, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
43. For an interesting discussion of the case, see Dumbauld, supra note 20.
A very different example of a claim to injunctive relief based on multiple considerations is
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 122 (1915), in which the absence of personal jurisdiction
of the court over the defendant was found to justify a different court in restraining the proceedings. The absence of jurisdiction could be said to render the proceedings (1) inconvenient and
vexatious, (2) violative of an obligation not to bring suit under circumstances suggesting a lack
of due process, and (3) contrary to an important policy of the enjoining court in protecting its
residents from unreasonable assertions of personal jurisdiction.
Given the nature of the objection to suit in Simon-violation of federal due process standards-the intervention does not seem warranted. The proper remedy is appeal within the
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difficulty of capturing the range and richness of requests for injunctive
relief, the three categories nevertheless provide a framework for
understanding the role of the anti-suit injunction in the sister-state
context and for evaluating its use in the small but growing number of
international cases.
B.

"FullFaith and Credit" and the Anti-Suit Injunction

Given its expansive potential for interference with judicial proceedings in sister-state courts, the anti-suit injunction would seem to
raise constitutional as well as policy problems. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires by its terms
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the...
Judicial Proceedings of every other State."'
Accordingly, litigants
contesting the propriety of out-of-state anti-suit injunctions, whether
on general principles or as applied to specific circumstances, have
occasionally raised constitutional objections based on that Clause.
Curiously, although sister-state anti-suit injunctions plausibly
constitute just the sort of denial of full faith and credit to "Judicial
Proceedings" in courts of other states that the Clause means to forbid,
the Supreme Court has held that the Clause does not pose a bar to
their issuance. In Cole v. Cunningham,45 the Court faced a situation
in which certain Massachusetts creditors, in anticipation of the insolvency of a Massachusetts debtor, assigned their claims to a New York
party who proceeded to attach obligations owed to the Massachusetts
debtor by various residents of New York. The debtor's assignee in
insolvency, appointed pursuant to a Massachusetts statute, then
sought an order from a Massachusetts court enjoining maintenance of
the New York action. The court granted the relief sought on the
ground that the New York action stood to confer preferred status
over the other creditors, both in breach of Massachusetts' overriding
interest in having all creditors treated equally as well as in fraud of
the Massachusetts statute whose provision for appointment of an
assignee in bankruptcy was designed precisely to avoid such a
breach.46
judicial system of the court hearing the principal suit, eventually including the United States
Supreme Court.
44. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. The clause is implemented by a statute providing that
"[s]uch. .. judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State... from
which they are taken." 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. 1738 (1966).
45. 133 U.S. 107 (1890).
46. For the same result, see Hazen v. Lydonville Bank, 70 Vt. 543, 41 A. 1046 (1898);
Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. 545 (1862). In a long line of similar cases, state courts have
enjoined residents from garnishing debts or attaching property of other residents in a sister-
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court rejected

any construction of the Clause that would in principle exclude the
traditional power of equity courts to prohibit out-of-state conduct in
the form of litigation. "The jurisdiction of the English Court of
Chancery to restrain persons within its... jurisdiction from doing
anything abroad, [including] the institution or the prosecution of an
action in a foreign court, is well settled." 47

If the Court meant not only to allow state courts to issue antisuit injunctions in appropriate cases, but also to ensure that courts
whose proceedings were affected would respect such orders, it would
find the results of its jurisprudence disappointing. State courts continue on occasion to hold that sister-state anti-suit injunctions are not
entitled to constitutional full faith and credit, and may in appropriate
circumstances be disregarded, at least by the court whose proceedings

have been restrained. 48 They base that view upon the very theory
used to justify the issuance of interjurisdictional injunctions in the
first place, namely that the order does not interfere directly with the
proceedings of a foreign court but only operates in personam against
the party enjoined. The foreign court, released from principles of

comity, may accordingly disregard it. 49 However, other courts whose
proceedings have been targeted by sister-state anti-suit injunctions
have accorded recognition to those decrees, in some instances reinforcing them with their own orders of prohibition and in others simply dismissing the action in question. 50
state jurisdiction, when those debts or property were exempt under the law of the forum and
common domicile. Stewart v. Thomson, 97 Ky. 575, 31 S.W. 133 (1895); Allen v. Buchanan,
97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 777 (1892); Mumper v. Wilson, 72 Iowa 163, 33 N.W. 449 (1887); Zimmerman v. Franke, 34 Kan. 650, 9 P. 747 (1886); Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203 (1877).
47. 133 U.S. at 116-17. Three justices dissented, asserting that any error in the proceedings in the state whose court actions were enjoined was subject to correction on appeal in the
courts of that state.
See also Weaver v. Alabama Great So. R. Co., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917).
48. E.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 25 Conn. Sup. 221, 200 A. 2d 734 (1964); James
v. Grand Trunk West. R.R., 14 Ill.
2d 356, 152 N.E. 2d 858, 867, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915
(1958); Wells v. Wells, 230 Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 (1935); Peterson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R.,
187 Minn. 228, 244 N.W. 823 (1932); Kepner v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 322 Mo. 299, 15
S.W.2d 825 (1929); Frye v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 15 Minn. 52, 195 N.W. 629 (1923), cert.
denied, 263 U.S. 723 (1924); Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922); Union Pacific
R.R. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 193 N.W. 161 (1923). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 103, comment b (1969).
For a full discussion of the case law, see Note, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Injunctions, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 633 (1959).
49. E.g., Wells v. Wells, 230 Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 (1935); Lindsey v. Wabash Ry., 61
S.W. 2d 369 (Mo. 1933); Peterson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 187 Minn. 228, 244 N.W. 823
(1932).
50. E.g., Smith v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 259, 271, 147 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8
(1978); Allen v. Chicago Great Western R.R., 239 Ill. App. 38, 44 (1925); Union Pacific R.R.
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American law provides no satisfactory solution to the problem of
non-acquiescence by the courts of one state in the restraint of their
proceedings ordered by the courts of another. As best as can be determined, in many cases the ordering of injunctive relief is not in the first
instance strongly influenced by the expected reaction of the sisterstate jurisdiction.5" Anticipating a combination of moral and legal
bases of compulsion,5 2 the court may be led to issue an injunction in
what it regards as a proper case irrespective of the cooperation it may
expect from the targeted court. This factor, combined with the broad
range of grounds for enjoining the conduct of out-of-state litigationparticularly the claimed inconvenience or vexatiousness of the proceedings or their offensiveness to the public policy of the enjoining
state-makes interjurisdictional conflict highly likely to follow in the
wake of the injunction's issuance.
Should the enjoining court's weapons fail it, and the targeted
court decline to dismiss the case or reinforce the injunction with one
of its own, the suit in question presumably will proceed to judgment.
Although a successful judgment is unlikely to be greeted with hospitality for enforcement purposes in the jurisdiction that unsuccessfully
sought to restrain the action, it should be readily enforceable in the
jurisdiction where rendered and in virtually all other American jurisdictions in which enforcement might be sought. Apart from the possible imposition of sanctions by the enjoining court for disobedience of
its order, the injunction thus will have failed in its essential purpose,
unless by chance that court prolongs the contest by enjoining the successful plaintiff from enforcing its judgment in the sister state where
rendered, 3 and for some unlikely reason is more successful in securing compliance with that order than it was with its first.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause would seem to have potential
application at various points in these scenarios, even assuming it does
not bar issuance of a sister-state anti-suit injunction in the first
v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 306, 193 N.W. 161, 162 (1923) (Holt J., dissenting); Equitable Life
Assurance Soc. v. Gex' Estate, 184 Miss. 577, 579, 186 So. 659, 663 (1939); Fisher v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 32, 72 So. 846, 848 (1916); Gilman v. Ketcham, 84 Wis. 60,
65, 54 N.W. 395, 396 (1893). For a comparable reaction in the state/federal context, see
Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1961).
51. See, e.g., Laumeier v. Laumeier, 308 Mo. 201, 271 S.W. 481 (1925); Hawley v. State
Bank of Chicago, 134 Il1.App. 96 (1907).
52. Techniques of legal compulsion include contempt sanctions, sequestration of property within the jurisdiction, and injunctions barring vital witnesses over whom the court has
jurisdiction from testifying in the out-of-state suit. See generally Note, supra note 23, at 79-81.
53. See, e.g., Vann v. Calcasieu Trust & Say. Bank, 204 S.W. 1062 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918);
Weed v. Hunt, 76 Vt. 212, 56 A. 980 (1904); Davis v. Cornue, 151 N.Y. 172, 45 N.E. 449
(1896).
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place. A first question is whether the Clause requires acquiescence
to the injunctive decree by the targeted court. It would appear not,
for not only do the targeted courts regularly disregard such decrees,
but those that defer to them sometimes emphasize that they are under
no compulsion to do so.5 A further question is whether the Clause at
least prohibits a court from enjoining enforcement by a sister-state
court of one of its own judgments, whatever the ground for the
injunction, but particularly when based on the refusal of the plaintiff
and the court in the sister-state proceedings to defer to the enjoining
court's attempt to halt them. No state court faced with that question
and,
has viewed the Full Faith and Credit Clause as an obstacle56
57
oddly, no federal court has evidently been asked to intervene.
Although the sister-state cases have been examined chiefly as
background for the international ones, my view is that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause has played too little a role in the anti-suit injunction context. It would appear from the wide assortment of challenges
to sister-state proceedings that virtually any defense, objection or
ground for dismissal-perhaps even a vehement denial of the merits
of the claim-could furnish a plausible basis for asking that the proceedings be halted. The spate of suits seeking declarations of nonliability arising out of transactions that are the subject of litigation
pending elsewhere, of which Laker is only the most celebrated example, amount precisely to an attempt to shift trial of the merits of a case
to a different forum and possibly a different law. It is another variation on the theme of preemption and frustration of out-of-state
proceedings.5 8
54. See notes 44-47 supra, and accompanying text.
55. See notes 48-49 supra, and cases cited therein. See generall&Comment, Extraterritorial Recognition of Injunctions against Suit, 39 YALE L.J. 719, 721 (1930).
56. Weed v. Hunt, 76 Vt. 212, 56 A. 980 (1904); Babcock v. Marshall, 21 Tex. Civ. App.
145, 50 S.W. 728 (1899); Rogers v. Gwinn, 21 Iowa 58 (1866); Payne v. O'Shea, 84 Mo. 129
(1884); New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Matzinger, 136 Ohio 271, 25 N.E.2d 349 (1940);
Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21 (1871); In re Kittinger's Estate, 101 N.Y.S. 844 (1950); Pearce v.
Olney, 20 Conn. 544 (1850).
Courts have held that the unsuccessful defendant may under proper circumstances obtain
an order from a sister-state court restraining enforcement of the judgment even, though the
defendant made no earlier application to the sister-state court to enjoin the proceedings. E.g.,
Gaunt v. Nemours Trading Corp., 194 App. Div. 668, 186 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dep't 1921);
Gordon v. Mann, 81 Kan. 537, 106 P. 286 (1910).
57. Supreme Court and lower federal court opinions do, however, speak expansively of
the reach and effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, eg., Roche v. McDonald, 275
U.S. 449,451 (1928) ("the... clause... requires that the judgment of a State court which had
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter in suit, shall be given in the courts of every
other State the same credit, validity and effect which it has in the State where it was rendered
and be equally conclusive upon the merits")., But no case deals specifically with the recognition owed to sister-state anti-suit injunctions.
58. Thus, a firm constitutional stand against the issuance of anti-suit injunctions with
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Claims of inconvenience, vexatiousness and oppression are at
bottom ones that a sister-state forum itself can consider fairly and
responsibly, and ones for which it has adequate grounds at its disposal
to consider, such as forum non conveniens and equity-based dismissals. Tort-based damage claims are available for the unconscionable
litigation that slips by. As far as prior and independent obligations
not to sue are concerned, they ought to be as readily enforceable in
the forum where suit has been brought as anywhere else. The public
policy claims are hardest, but even many of these-such as the procedural due process and First Amendment cases--deserve and presumably would receive a full and fair hearing in the state where the
challenged suit is pending. As to the others, comfort should be taken
in the fact that the public policy systems among the states do not
widely and regularly diverge and that, in any event, due process now
unquestionably places some constraints on the states' freedom of
action in matters of choice of law.5 9
This is not to say that states will not continue to differ in matters
of public policy and, equally important, in their assessments of the
competing jurisdictions' claims to have their policies prevail in any
given case. However, some risk of public friction and private disadvantage inheres in any judicial system based on separate, co-equal and
largely autonomous state judiciaries. In facing that risk, we should
not afford license to the courts of one state to enjoin the conduct of
litigation in the courts of another, and then afford license to the
targeted state to disregard the injunction and possibly even respond in
kind. In most respects, a refusal to recognize or enforce a sister-state
judgment is a less drastic and intrusive measure than an attempt to
halt sister-state proceedings in their tracks, and yet the Full Faith and
Credit Clause has been held to bar a state court from denying effect to
a sister-state judgment on public policy grounds, however deeply
offensive it may be to policies the court holds dear.' ° Another advantage of introducing the Full Faith and Credit Clause at an early stage
in the anti-suit injunction context is avoiding the further damage to
that Clause flowing from refusals of the targeted state to respect sister-state injunctions and, what may be worse, from attempts by the
respect to sister-state proceedings is logically accompanied by recognition of a rule of lis
pendens. That rule likewise finds a basis in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. If a lis pendens
rule risks provoking races to the courthouse, it should at least avoid a more treacherous race to
judgment.
59. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981).
60. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Hieston v. Nat'l City Bank of Chicago, 51

App. D.C. 394, 396, 280 F. 525, 528 (1922). See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS, § 117 (1971).
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enjoining state to forbid the enforcement in a sister-state court of its
very own judgments.6 1
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTISUIT INJUNCTION

Considering the broad acceptance of the anti-suit injunction in
sister-state practice on both policy and constitutional grounds, it is
not surprising that the international anti-suit injunction has found
similar acceptance. Most courts faced with the question-and they
have not been many--claim authority in proper circumstances to
enjoin a party within their jurisdiction from pursuing an action in a
foreign country court.62 On the constitutional level, they would
appear to be unquestionably right. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not speak to foreign country proceedings, and even if it did, it is
difficult to see why American courts by virtue of that Clause would be
under any greater prohibition regarding jurisdictions to which we
have no constitutional bond than they are regarding jurisdictions to
which we do.
However, if the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not speak to
international anti-suit injunctions, other provisions of the Constitution may. Judicial interference with a foreign country's exercise of
adjudicatory authority has a potential for embarrassing the political
branches of government and disturbing our relations with that country. Admittedly, that concern has not prevented courts from occasionally refusing to enforce a cause of action arising under foreign
law,6 3 from denying effect on public policy grounds to the otherwise
applicable foreign law, 64 or from refusing to recognize or enforce a
foreign country judgment.6 5 However, all of the latter measures may
61. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
62. E.g., In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on
rehearingen banc, 446 F.2d 907 (1971), rev'd on othergroundssub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412
F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969); Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834, 841 (5th
Cir. 1961); Philip v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1958); Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States,
583 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Minn. 1982); Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 531
F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Minn. 1982); Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 450 F. Supp. 835,
837 (S.D. Fla. 1978). See generally Messner, The Jurisdictionofa Court of Equity over Persons
to Compel the Doing ofActs Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REv. 494,
495-96 (1930).
63. E.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
64. E.g., Kristinus v. H. Stern Com. E. Ind. S.A., 463 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
65. E.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895); Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc.,
640 F.2d 77, 81 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Davis' Will, 31 Misc. 2d 270, 272-73, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 533,
536-37 (1961). See also Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Somportex
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be understood as refusals to lend assistance to the enforcement of foreign law or to the realization of a foreign judgment, rather than as
positive interferences with foreign judicial process. In fact, the affront
that restraints of foreign judicial proceedings are apt to produce suggests that the act of state doctrine would appropriately be applied in
these situations. Although I have found no federal case categorically
rejecting international anti-suit injunctions on separation of powers
grounds, particular circumstances can readily be imagined in which a
rejection on those grounds would be appropriate. As a practical matter, however, one would expect constitutional concerns of this nature
to enter into consideration indirectly as factors in a court's discretionary decision whether or not to issue or sustain an anti-suit injunction
directed at foreign proceedings.
A second constitutional difficulty with the international anti-suit
injunction, specifically when deployed by state courts, is its potential
for state intrusion into an area of distinctly federal interest. When the
Supreme Court invalidated a state statute that denied nonresident
aliens the right to inherit real or personal property located in the state
unless able to demonstrate that an American in analogous situations
could inherit real or personal property located in the decedent's country, it justified the result in terms of the federal government's paramount interest in avoiding embarrassment or conflict in the conduct
of its foreign relations.66 To my knowledge, no court has categorically invoked the federal government's foreign relations power to bar
state courts from issuing orders in restraint of foreign judicial proceedings. Interestingly, neither has any federal court to my knowledge suggested that a state court's exercise of injunctive power to
restrain foreign judicial proceedings amounts under the circumstances
to an infringement of Congress' or the Executive's constitutional
authority to conduct the country's foreign relations. However, there
are most likely some circumstances in which a court would be justified in so holding. It is even more likely that sensitivity to the impact
of an overseas anti-suit injunction on the country's foreign relations
from time to time actually induces caution in a state court's willingness to afford this type of relief.
V.

JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT IN THE INTERNATIONAL CASES

The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,405
U.S. 1017 (1972).
66. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187
(1961).
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while principles of federalism and separation of powers do not as such
prevent state and federal courts, repectively, from issuing anti-suit
injunctions with respect to foreign judicial proceedings, those principles nevertheless properly influence their judgment whether to grant
such discretionary relief in any given case. This conclusion nevertheless raises the further question whether American courts as a general
rule should show greater or lesser restraint (if not simply the same
level of restraint) in exercising their injunctive powers in the international as compared to the sister-state arena.
There are respectable arguments to be made in favor of showing
both less restraint and greater restraint in international cases. If one
considers the policy reasons most commonly advanced for the issuance of anti-suit injunctions, the international cases, all other things
being equal, are more attractive candidates than the domestic ones.
At least some of the objectives that the remedy serves67 would seem as
a general matter more compelling in the international context. In
addition, one of the principal arguments invoked against anti-suit
injunctions-namely that the proper remedy for wrongful litigation is
by way of appeal to higher authority within the judicial system where
the litigation is taking place 6s-loses a good deal of force when
applied to foreign country proceedings. Leaving aside any suspicion
of national bias on the part of foreign tribunals, the appellate court
abroad may simply endorse the presumably troubling practice or policy of that jurisdiction's lower courts. A sign of the heightened stakes
in the international cases is the greater readiness of courts to issue
"counter-anti-suit injunctions," whose purpose, as noted,69 is to prevent the issuance of an anti-suit injunction by a foreign court. 70 Preemptive strikes of this sort do not appear to be as common a feature of
sister-state practice.
Although anti-suit injunctions find their greatest utility in the
international setting, it is also in that setting that they have their
greatest capacity for mischief. Not only are foreign relations apt to be
more fragile than sister-state relations, but they are also more apt to
be disturbed-specifically by the apparent interference of one state's
courts in the judicial business of another's. From a more purely
67. These objectives, again, are prevention of highly inconvenient or otherwise vexatious

litigation, enforcement of a prior obligation not to sue, and preservation of the court's own
jurisdiction or vindication of some peculiarly important public policy of the local forum.
68. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 116-17 (1890).
69. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
70. E.g., Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 577 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1983),
aff'd sub nom., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F. 2d. 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); James v. Grand Trunk W-R.R., 14 II. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied, 358 U.S.

915 (1958).
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institutional point of view, the interest of the federal executive in managing the country's foreign affairs also stands to be impaired by efforts
of state and federal courts alike to restrain foreign country judicial
proceedings. It is on account of these heightened sensitivities that
courts admonish with particular emphasis in the international cases
that anti-suit injunctions "should be used sparingly" 71 and "only in
the most compelling circumstances, ' 72 and that considerations of
international comity deserve special weight.
An additional factor that favors restraint in the use of injunctive
relief against foreign country proceedings is the availability in that
arena of weapons not normally available on account of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause in the sister-state cases: the nonrecognition and
nonenforcement of the resulting judgment. In other words, it may be
argued that anti-suit injunctions fill a need in the domestic setting,
where judgments virtually command recognition and enforcement,
that is not matched in the foreign setting.73 However, this argument
suffers from the fact that nonrecognition and nonenforcement fall
short of injunctive relief in several important respects. In the first
place, a strategy of disregard of a foreign country judgment does not
meet objections that are based on the foreign litigation itself, such as
its inconvenience and vexatiousness, its violation of a prior obligation
not to sue, and its offense against certain aspects of public policy, as
opposed to its outcome. Moreover, the enjoining court may not be
the only jurisdiction in which recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment will be sought and may be had. The judgment may be
given effect in the place where rendered or in any number of third
countries. Therefore, although the anti-suit injunction has its own
weaknesses-notably the ease with which it can be ignored by the
court to which it is directed-it also has features that make it a more
potent weapon than an essentially defensive refusal to recognize or
enforce an objectionable foreign judgment.7'
71. Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982); Philip v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1958).
See also Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir.
1969).
72. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 n.52 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
73. Most state legislation on the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments, and most international agreements on the subject, provide exceptions to the rule of
recognition and enforcement when lack of jurisdiction, fraud, basic procedural unfairness or
offense to local public policy can be shown.
74. For the contrary view that nonrecognition and nonenforcement of foreign judgments
is an adequate weapon, rendering international anti-suit injunctions largely unnecessary, see
Note, Antisuit Injunctions,supra note 5, at 1063, 1068; Note, InjunctionsAgainst the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad, supra note 5, at 181.
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In sum, the international anti-suit injunction cases appear to lend
themselves to two contradictory judicial attitudes. On the one hand,
they represent situations in which the policy reasons for restraining
out-of-state court proceedings have their greatest force, and the
chances of self-correction by the jurisdiction whose proceedings are in
question are weakest. These considerations counsel against excessive
judicial hesitation in use of the interjurisdictional anti-suit injunction.
On the other hand, the equitable nature of the remedy renders it an
especially appropriate subject of the special consideration and reserve
evoked by the notion of international comity. To judge by the nature
and strength of reactions provoked by the interjurisdictional anti-suit
injunction, the international arena is far more sensitive to this form of
perceived judicial overreaching.75
The section that follows takes a closer look at each of the three
categories of cases associated with the issuance of anti-suit injunctions. Examining the principal international cases, it identifies the
factors that properly bear on the wisdom and desirability of
restraining foreign proceedings on the particular ground asserted.
VI.

A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-SUIT
INJUNCTION

As indicated earlier, courts have directed anti-suit injunctions at
proceedings in other jurisdictions in order to achieve one of three
broadly stated objectives: the prevention of highly inconvenient or
vexatious litigation, the vindication of a prior and independent obligation not to sue, and preservation of the enjoining court's own jurisdiction or other local policy-based need to forestall foreign judicial
proceedings. Because the anti-suit injunction instrument serves so
broad a range of objectives, the conditions that should be placed on its
use understandably vary with the particular objective pursued in any
given case. Moreover, as this section demonstrates, the importance of
the international, as distinct from the interstate, character of a suit
likewise varies according to the category of use to which the instrument is being put.
75. The Laker case developed into a full-scale diplomatic episode from which even President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher were unable to distance themselves. Following
international negotiations, President Reagan ordered that a Justice Department grand jury
investigation of the conspiracy alleged by Laker be terminated. Jury Probe of Airlines Called
Off. ResidentialAction Seen Bow to Britain in Fare Dispute, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1984, at Al,
col. 1. On the other hand, the yearly scores of sister-state anti-suit injunction cases do not
appear to have had important political spillover effects for the jurisdictions involved.
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Convenience-BasedAnti-Suit Injunctions

A first cluster of situations in which anti-suit injunctions have
been issued or upheld basically entails claims that judicial orderliness
and efficiency will be served by enjoining the conduct of one action in

deference to another. For example, a party that has prevailed in litigation may consider having its adversary enjoined from relitigating
the same dispute in a foreign court. The foreign court's application of
principles of res judicata would presumably render unnecessary any
further intervention by the rendering court, whether through issuance
of an anti-suit injunction or otherwise,7 6 though should the judgment

be denied res judicata effect an injunction may well issue."
1. Lis Pendens, Forum Non Conveniens and the Anti-Suit
Injunction
The more likely and difficult scenario is one where a party that
has not yet prevailed in its action seeks an anti-suit injunction to prevent or to halt a second suit in a foreign court on essentially the same
cause of action, 78 a suit whose object may be little more than a declaration of non-liability on the principal cause of action. Less commonly, a party against whom proceedings are underway in one forum
may seek to restrain the plaintiff from bringing suit in another forum
on the same or a related cause of action, 79 especially if the first forum
has a special interest in the consolidation of all related claims.8 " In
76. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230, 235 (1922); Looney v. Eastern Texas
R.R., 247 U.S. 214, 221 (1918); Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203
Mass. 159, 221, 89 N.E. 193, 213 (1909); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting
Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 474, 71 A. 153, 159-60 (1908).
77. E.g., Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939); Wood v.
Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S.
1081 (1984); Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971); Scott v. Hunt Oil, 398 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1968); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 230 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill.
1964).
Judge Wilkey, in the Laker case, identified as one of the few situations in which the issuance of an anti-suit injunction by an American court was justified the case of a foreign action
instituted on a claim that has already gone to judgment in the forum. 731 F.2d at 928. See
also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230, 235 (1922); Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R.,
247 U.S. 214, 221 (1918); Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass.
159, 221, 89 N.E. 193, 213 (1909); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co., 74
N.J. Eq. 457, 474, 71 A. 153, 159-60 (1908).
78. E.g., Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877
(3d Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 644 (1982); Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982); Medtronic Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp.,
518 F. Supp. 946 (D. Minn. 1981), aff'd, 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981).
79. E.g., Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 450 F. Supp. 835 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
80. This interest may be reflected in general rules about compulsory counterclaims or
specific policies about the consolidation of claims in particular areas of the law, like
bankruptcy.
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these situations, recognition of the principle of lis pendens by the second court would normally cause the proceeding before it to be sus-

pended until the first action is completed and its outcome entitled to
res judicata treatment."1 However, the doctrine of lis pendens"2 was
originally developed in the interest of judicial orderliness within a single legal system, unitary or federal.8 3 A rule according priority to the
action first filed makes especially good sense in that setting, given
every sovereign's evident interest in regulating parallel proceedings
among its courts. Also, the application of lis pendens is less likely to
defeat overriding concerns of convenience or forum public policy in
domestic than in international cases.
Although a number of American courts have applied lis pendens
thinking to international cases,84 it is generally agreed that the doctrine as such does not operate in that setting."5 Instead, courts generally permit parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim to
continue in different jurisdictions and eventually proceed to judgment.86 In fact, it is difficult as a policy matter to conclude that priority in timing should count as anything more than one among many
different factors to be considered in the international anti-suit injunction setting. A basically mechanical rule of that sort takes too little
account of the conflicting interests and policies likely to be at issue in
81. E.g., Bank Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 122 Kan. 831, 253 P. 431 (1927); Wade v.
Crump, 173 S.W. 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Freick v. Hinkley, 122 Minn. 24, 141 N.W. 1096
(1913). Butsee notes 85-86 infra and accompanying text. For an example of the application of
is pendens in an international case, see Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv., Ltd., 471 F.
Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Unfortunately, the Restatement of Conflict of Laws would allow
courts even in the sister-state context to entertain an action although an action on the same
claim is pending elsewhere. Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws, § 86 (1971). The
European Communities' Brussels Convention does, however, adopt a "first-flled rule." Courts
must dismiss suits brought on a cause of action already the subject of litigation in another
member state court. Where the actions are merely related, dismissal by the second court is
discretionary. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, arts. 21-22, 15 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 299) 32 (1972).
82. The is pendens doctrine provides for a court in which a suit has been fied to stay
proceedings when an action between the same parties over the same dispute has already been
filed and is pending in another court.
83. Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532 (1824). In Smith v. McIver, Chief Justice
Marshall observed that "[i]n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has
possession of the subject must decide it." Id. at 535. See also Cresta Blanca Wine Co. v.
Eastern Wine Corp., 143 F.2d 1012, 1014 (2d Cir. 1944).
84. Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 664 F.2d 660, 663 (8th Cir. 1981); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 n.10 (3d Cir.
1981), aff'don other grounds,456 U.S. 694 (1982); Canadian Filters (Harwich) v. Lear-Siegler,
Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969).
85. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887
n.10 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
86. See Note, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad, supra note 5, at
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the international cases. Moreover, the criticism most often leveled at
the prior filing rule-that it encourages the proverbial race to the
courthouses---seems decidedly more troubling when the race is run
across international jurisdictional lines. Indications in any event are
that international lis pendens is a principle not regularly honored.,
Considering the frailty of the notion of international lis pendens,
the court of pendency of an action simply cannot rely on foreign
tribunals subsequently invoked automatically to decline jurisdiction
on the ground that suit on a substantially similar cause of action is
already pending elsewhere. Experience shows that in those circumstances courts sometimes inquire whether maintenance of parallel
proceedings would be so inconvenient or wasteful of judicial
resources, or would cause such delay or complexity, as to justify the
extraordinary measure of an international anti-suit injunction. 9
A leading American decision restraining foreign proceedings in
the interest of convenience is Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Company.9° In that case, the plaintiff Cargill sought a five

million dollar recovery in federal court in Minnesota from each of two
separate insurance companies under policies covering losses resulting
from dishonesty on the part of certain employees of plaintiff's English
subsidiary. 91 After denying one of the insurance companies' motion
for dismissal of the action on forum non conveniens grounds, the
court entertained Cargill's motion for a preliminary injunction specifically barring the insurance company from continuing an English
court action against Cargill. The English court action had been
brought on the very same day that Cargill instituted suit in the United
States and sought a declaration of non-liability to Cargill.
The federal court issued the specific anti-suit injunction sought.
While invoking the familiar caution that relief of that sort should be
ordered sparingly, the court concluded that it had both general
authority to issue an anti-suit injunction targeting foreign country
87. See Note, Anti-suit Injunctions,supra note 5, at 1042 n.18.
88. See Spiro, The Defence of Lis Alibi Pendens, 9 Comp. & Int'l L. Rev. of So. Afr. 89
(1976).
89. E.g., Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert denied,457 U.S. 1105 (1982); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982); American
Home Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 603 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Chase
Manhattan Bank v. State of Iran, 484 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). American courts have
taken the view that parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim are not as a general
principle objectionable and that something more than duplication of effort or needless expenditure of resources must be shown. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 926-28 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
90. 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982).
91. Both the alleged dishonesty and the resulting loss occurred in England.
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proceedings and specific warrant to do so under the circumstances.

The reasons it gave92 amounted to a finding that the foreign action
would be so inconvenient as to warrant restraint of those
proceedings.93

The discussion thus far has emphasized judicial orderliness and
economy as crucial values in the treatment of parallel litigation, but,
as the sister-state cases amply demonstrate, the parties may have

more private reasons for seeking injunctive relief. One such private
reason, closely linked to considerations of judicial orderliness and
economy, is a claim that the foreign suit, whether pending or contemplated, is vexatious or oppressive. 94 The recent appellate decision in

Smith, Kline & French Laboratoriesv. Bloch 95 illustrates the claim.
Bloch, an English research scientist, brought suit in Pennsylvania
against both an English company with which he had a consultancy
agreement and its American parent, for breach of that agreement.
The English company applied in English court for an anti-suit injunc96
tion against Bloch, on the ground that England was the "natural"
and convenient forum for the dispute and that Bloch's reasons for
choosing the American court included the settlement value of an
92. The court concluded that "adjudication of the same issue in two separate actions will
result in unnecessary delay, substantial inconvenience and expense to the parties and witnesses,
and... could result in inconsistent rulings or a race to judgment." 531 F. Supp. at 715.
93. For some courts, the mere prospect of duplicative proceedings justifies issuance of an
anti-suit injunction. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 518 F. Supp. 946 (D.
Minn.), aff'd, 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981), the court enjoined the conduct of overseas litigation even inthe absence of "evidence that the foreign suits [were] vexatious or harassing, or
that they were brought to evade the protections of American law." Id. at 956. See also In re
Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehearingen banc, 446
F.2d 907 (1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972).
94. Of course, it could be that a foreign lawsuit is found oppressive or vexatious without
particular regard to the relative convenience of two potential fora. According to Lord Diplock
in the Laker case, an anti-suit injunction may properly be issued to restrain foreign litigation of
"frivolous and vexatious" claims. [1985] A.C. 58, 86 (1984). A plainly meritless action,
regardless of where brought, might well meet that test. An American example is the case of
Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971). There, a federal district court in Florida
enjoined a local real estate broker from pursuing an action in the Bahamas for specific performance of an alleged contract to sell land located in the Bahamas. Though the Bahamas was
a perfectly appropriate forum for such a suit, the American court found that the Bahaman
action was nonetheless oppressive and deserved to be enjoined because the underlying agreement was one as to which only six of the seven co-owners of the land in question had assented,
and was therefore manifestly unenforceable in the Bahaman court.
The Bethell case does, however, raise the question whether the enjoining court needs to
have a substantial interest in the case in order to justify its intervention. Here, the six coowners, or their successors, were all Florida residents and the sales agreement with the six was
signed in Florida.
95. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72 (C.A. 1982).
96. On the meaning of the "natural forum" in English law, see notes 107-108 infra and
accompanying text.
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inconvenient forum. Although the applicants failed to have the Pennsylvania action dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, it did
secure from the English court an anti-suit injunction directed at those
proceedings. When, as in the Smith, Kline & French case, a vexatiousness claim is raised, the public and private interests in convenient
litigation overlap substantially, much as they do in the more usual
case of motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.9 7
2.

The Dual Aspect of Inconvenience

The inconvenience addressed by anti-suit injunctions has at least
two dimensions. One is the inconvenience that inheres in any set of
parallel proceedings on the same claim. It is simply not convenient,
certainly not from the viewpoint of the administration of justice, to
have a single claim adjudicated concurrently in separate fora. As
noted, 98 a rule of international lis pendens, if observed, would satisfactorily address this species of inconvenience. However, since the second court seized of the case is unlikely to decline jurisdiction on this
ground, the first court may be tempted to issue an anti-suit injunction
to protect its own jurisdiction. 99 This scenario demonstrates what
may be considered the "affirmative" or "offensive" use of the lis
pendens doctrine. As in Cargill, courts affording injunctive relief on
this basis are apt to emphasize both the public and private interests in
avoiding delay, inconvenience, a race to judgment and the risk of
inconsistent rulings.
One good reason for not institutionalizing the anti-suit injunction
as an offensive version of the lis pendens stay is precisely that the
inconvenience inherent in parallel proceedings is unlikely to be the
only inconvenience factor of interest. Alongside the advantage of
having a claim heard in a single forum lies the advantage of having it
heard in the decidedly more convenient of two competing fora if in
fact there is one. Although the Cargillcourt did not enter into a comparison of the merits of Minnesota and the United Kingdom as fora
for the case, other courts have made a comparative convenience
inquiry and have strongly buttressed their efforts to halt the duplicative proceeding with a showing that they also happen to represent the
97. For an older case in which an American court addressed both the inconvenience and
vexatiousness factors, as well as elements of fraud, in enjoining conduct of foreign country
litigation, see Labak v. Graznar, 54 Ohio App. 191, 194, 6 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1935).
98. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
99. Williams v. Payne, 150 Kan. 462, 94 P. 2d 341 (1939); Oates v. Morningside College,
217 Iowa 1059, 252 N.W. 783 (1934); United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wright, 156 F. 244
(1907); Gaunt v. Nemours Trading Corp., 194 App. Div. 668, 186 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dep't
1921); Field v. Holbrook, 3 Abb. Pr. 377 (N.Y. 1856). Contra Ambursen Constr. Co. v.
Northern Constr. Co., 140 Ga. 1, 78 S.E. 340 (1913).
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decidedly more convenient forum. This branch of the inconvenience
analysis may in turn be thought of as the "affirmative" or "offensive"
use of the forum non conveniens doctrine. 1°°
Considering the important difference between the "defensive"
forum non conveniens dismissal and the "offensive" anti-suit injunction, courts should be even more reticent about issuing foreign antisuit injunctions under the banner of orderliness and convenience than
they are about declining to exercise jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds. In the ordinary "defensive" posture the court simply stays its own hand, while in the "offensive" posture it seeks
indirectly to stay the hand of a foreign court. Accordingly, a court
considering issuance of an anti-suit injunction on convenience
grounds should be no less demanding, and arguably even more
demanding, about the required showing of inconvenience than in
ordinary forum non conveniens dismissals. A court certainly ought
not to proceed on the assumption that a pending or contemplated foreign action is ipso facto a source of inconvenience, delay and risk of
inconsistency or race to judgment sufficient to justify issuance of an
anti-suit injunction. In fact, it ought not issue an anti-suit injunction
simply because it concludes that on balance it, rather than the foreign
court, is the more convenient forum. Instead, a threshold requirement of inconvenience should have to be met before courts deploy this
particular instrument. In addition, a court before which challenged
proceedings are pending should be given the chance to apply its own
"defensive" forum non conveniens doctrine, if indeed it has one,
before a foreign court asserts the right to call those proceedings vexatious and inconvenient, and seeks to restrain them.101
Unfortunately, courts generally have not paid much attention to
the question whether a more decisive showing of inconvenience ought
to be required in the anti-suit injunction compared to the forum non
conveniens context. Some courts virtually exclude the issuance of
100. In the sister-state context, cases are legion raising the question whether suit in the
chosen forum subjects -the defendant to such hardship as to justify the more convenient forum
(typically also the defendant's domicile) in restraining the conduct of those proceedings. See
Note, supra note 23, at 101-104, and cases cited therein.
101. The most recent English decisions have adopted this view. See, for example, Bank
of Tokyo v. Karoon, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 414, 431, [1986] 3 All E.R. 468, 486 (C.A.); Metall and
Rohstoff A.G. v. ACLI Metals (London) Ltd., [1984] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 598, 609 (C.A.). An
important proviso is that the court where the suit is pending can be expected to deal in a fair
and unbiased way with the claim that the suit is highly vexatious or inconvenient. See Hartley,
supra note 5, at 509 n.98, citing Carvalho v. Hull, Blyth (Angola) Ltd., [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1228
(C.A.).
For an American court endorsement of the practice, see Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd.
v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969). See generally, Note, Injunctions Against the
Prosecution of Litigation Abroad, supra note 5, at 178-79.
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anti-suit injunctions altogether when based on arguments of convenience. In their view, courts should tolerate the conduct in different
jurisdictions of parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim.
The risk of inconsistent rulings as such is apparently met by the
assumption, which may not always be founded, that as soon as one
case goes to judgment, the outcome of the other will be dictated by
operation of res judicata. The other inconveniences of parallel litiga-

tion-duplication of effort, waste of resources, burdensomeness of litigation in the less convenient forum, and the costs of the proverbial

race to judgment-are largely to be disregarded as grounds for
restraining the conduct of foreign judicial proceedings. 102 Most
courts, however, seem to suppose that severe inconvenience may in3
10
itself justify the issuance of an international anti-suit injunction,
and they in effect treat the test for issuance of anti-suit injunctions,
when based on considerations of convenience, as essentially the same
as for dismissal of a local action on forum non conveniens grounds.
3. The British Approach to Convenience-Based Injunctions
Modem usage of anti-suit injunctions in Britain basically follows
the latter pattern. The rule, as restated by the House of Lords in
1981, is that if a party demonstrates that England would be a substantially more convenient forum for litigation than a foreign jurisdiction,
and that the actual or potential plaintiff in the foreign court would not
lose a legitimate advantage by having the case heard in England, then
an English court would be justified in enjoining the pending or prospective foreign proceedings.l ° 4 The case in which the House of
102. See e.g., China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d. 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1987); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-28 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco Energy Co., 673 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.
1007 (1982); Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1986).
103. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.), aff'g
518 F. Supp. 946 (D. Minn. 1981); Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. National Hockey League,
652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982); American Home Assurance
Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 603 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford
Accid. & Indemn. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982).
104. Castanho v. Root & Brown, [1981] A.C. 557 (H.L.). Coupled with the English
doctrine of forum non conveniens, whereby a local action might be dismissed where doing so
would place the action in a substantially more convenient court without unfair legal detriment
to the plaintiff, the anti-suit injunction device effectively gave English courts the power to
decide where international disputes should be litigated. The English doctrine of forum non
conveniens was restated by the House of Lords in MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd.,
[1978] A.C. 795 (H.L.), and more recently applied in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Consulex
Ltd., [1986] 3 W.L.R. 972, 985-86, [1986] 3 All E. R. 843, 854-55 (H.L.). See also The Abidin
Daver, [1984] A.C. 398, 411-12 (Lord Diplock), 416 (Lord Keith); The Atlantic Star, [1974]
A.C. 438,454 (Lord Reid); Metall und RohstoffA.G. v. ACLI Metals (London) Ltd., [1984] 1
Lloyd's L. Rep. 598, 602 (C.A).
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Lords clarified the rule-Castanhov. Root & Brown 10 -illustrates its
application. There, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action in
Britain, the place of accident, against the British and Panamanian
subsidiaries of a Texas company. While that suit was still pending
(albeit with an admission of liability by the defendants), the plaintiff
abandoned the British action and initiated essentially the same action
in Texas, apparently on account of the much higher damages thought
to be available in that forum. Upon application by the defendants, the
British court issued an anti-suit injunction to the plaintiff respecting
the American action, only to have its decision overruled by the Court
of Appeal whose ruling in turn was upheld by the House of Lords. In
the Lords' view, the prospect of higher damage awards in the United
States was a legitimate advantage of which the plaintiff should not be
deprived through issuance of a British anti-suit injunction. Though
10 6 Casthis view of damage levels has not been consistently followed,
tanho remains the essential framework of analysis in British anti-suit
injunction cases, at least in situations where parallel proceedings are
or may be going on in two different jurisdictions.
The Castanho approach has since been called into question on
account of changes in the English doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The latest forum non conveniens cases require that consideration be
given to a claim's "natural forum."1 0 7 The "natural forum," in this
context, means the forum "with which the action has the most real
and substantial connection.' 0 8 Thus, the English courts' willingness
to decline jurisdiction on inconvenience grounds turns on whether
England or some other jurisdiction is the claim's natural forum. The
strong presumption in favor of the natural forum may, however, be
overcome by the legitimate advantages that the chosen forum offers
the plaintiff.10 9 Translating the latest refinements in forum non conveniens doctrine into the anti-suit injunction context seems to yield
the following results. First, whatever may be its opinion of the
105. [1981] A.C. 557 (H.L. 1980).
106. In Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 738, [1983]
2 All E.R. 72, 78 (C.A. 1982), the Court of Appeal found the prospect of higher damages not
to be a legitimate advantage. Lord Denning would not attach such significance to the damages

aspect of the case. The other members of the court concluded that since an American court
would apply a British measure of damages to the case, the American forum did not in fact
present an advantage. For a still different view, see Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon, [1986] 3 W.L.R.
414, 422, [1986] 3 All E.R. 468, 477 (C.A.), in which Lord Ackner insisted that a feature of
American legal practice (contingent fee representation) might cease to be a legitimate legal
advantage if the proceedings themselves were vexatious.
107. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Consulex Ltd., [1986] 3 W.L.R. 972, 987, [1986] 3 All

E.R. 843, 856 (C.A.).
108. Id.
109. [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 991-93, [1986] 3 All E.R. at 859-61.
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foreign forum, an English court will not entertain an application for
an anti-suit injunction unless England is the claim's natural forum.
However, even if this condition is satisfied, an injunction still will not
issue if its effect would be to deprive the plaintiff unjustly of the
advantages of the foreign forum. 110 Although the doctrinal modification may reduce the incidence of interjurisdictional anti-suit injunctions by English courts, the terms "natural forum" and "substantial
justice" lend themselves to a wide range of interpretations and to correspondingly uncertain results. There is also a very substantial likelihood that British courts will not consider the cluster of plaintifffriendly features associated with American civil procedure-ample
discovery, attorneys' fees rules, contingent-fee representation, the civil
jury trial, readier availability of punitive damages and higher damage
levels generally-to be "just advantages" of the foreign forum. 1 1 In
fact, it is precisely these procedural characteristics of American civil
litigation that appear recently to have reawakened this form of injunctive activity on the part of British courts and
that explain why Ameri12
target.'
standard
its
been
have
can courts
Recent British cases thus reflect a conscious parallel between the
standards governing defensive and offensive use of the forum non conveniens notion. In addition, British courts have lately shown an even
greater distaste than American courts for the awkwardness of parallel
proceedings."1 3 The end result is a pronounced willingness on their
110. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak (June 1, 1987). In this
case, the Privy Council (reviewing the Brunei courts' conclusion that Texas had become the
natural forum) held that Brunei was the natural forum for a wrongful death action arising out
of a helicopter crash in Brunei, where the decedent had his domicile and where the crash
occurred, even though the helicopter was manufactured by a French company and operated by
a Malaysian company under a contract with a Sarawak company. The Privy Council also
found that parallel proceedings in Texas where the French manufacturer did business would
prejudice the manufacturer because it would not be able to assert contribution claims there
against the Malaysian and Sarawak parties. On these findings, the Privy Council felt justified
in enjoining the parallel Texas action.
111. See, eg., Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, [1983]
2 All E.R. 72 (C.A. 1982).
112. See Hartley, supra note 5, at 502-05, citing Midland Bank v. Laker Airways, [1986]

1 All E.R. 526, 536; British Airways v. Laker Airways, [1985] A.C. 58, 78; Smith, Kline &
French Laboratories Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72 (C.A).

British courts have not always taken a consistently negative view of the procedural features of the American litigation cited. In one case, the Court of Appeal thought wider pre-trial
discovery and availability of punitive damages in the United States a legitimate advantage to be
offset against the expense and delay of a jury trial. When the plaintiff in the American action
finally agreed to forego a jury trial, the balance tilted in favor of allowing the American action
to proceed, and the anti-suit injunction entered by the British trial court was accordingly
vacated. Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. ACLI Metals (London) Ltd., [1984] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep.
598 (C.A.).
113. The drawbacks of parallel litigation, according to Lord Diplock, include the added
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part to decide for themselves whether the inconvenience of concurrent
actions will be tolerated and, if not, to determine through a forum non
conveniens dismissal or international anti-suit injunction whether it is
the British or the overseas action that will survive.
4. Anti-Suit Injunctions and Choice of Law
A further matter of importance is the question whether a court's
willingness to restrain foreign judicial proceedings ought to be influenced by the difference in substantive law apt to be applied by the two
competing fora, assuming the difference to be outcome-determinative
under the circumstances. The analogous question has of course arisen
in the context of dismissals for forum non conveniens. There the
understanding is that a change in law adverse to the plaintiff should
not of itself dissuade a court from dismissing a case on forum non
conveniens grounds in otherwise appropriate circumstances. 114 In the
Cargill case, Judge Murphy conceded that the English court would
have applied English rather than American law to several important
issues in the case, and that the former was distinctly more favorable to
the plaintiff in the foreign action. He nevertheless issued the anti-suit
injunction requested,1 15 essentially on a finding that the convenience
of litigation in his court outweighed the foreign plaintiff's partisan
advantages in an English forum.
More difficult is the question whether the foreign proceedings
should be restrained if the local court cannot or will not enforce a
cause of action or underlying policy that the foreign court would normally enforce. The question becomes most troubling where convenience-based injunctions, rather than those based on forum public
policy or prior obligations not to sue, are concerned. Where the local
court cannot or will not enforce a foreign cause of action or underlying policy on account of its deep offense to the local forum, the situation is precisely one that may be appropriate for issuance of a public
policy-based international anti-suit injunction.1 16 Where the conduct
of foreign litigation contravenes a prior obligation not to sue in that
forum (or in any forum), the obligation should in principle be
expense and inconvenience, the race to judgment and the risk of inconsistent rulings. The
Abidin Daver, [1984] A.C. 398; Metall und RohstoffA.G. v. ACLI Metals (London), [1984] 1
Lloyd's L. Rep. 598 (C.A.) For a comparison with older British views about the use of antisuit injunctions to avoid parallel litigation, see Note, Antisuit Injunctions, supra note 5, at
1057-58, citing Cohen v. Rothfield, [1919] 1 K.B. 410, 413-14 (C.A. 1918) (Scrutton, L.J.).
114. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). According to the Supreme
Court, the difference in applicable law actually deserves little weight in the overall forum non
conveniens determination.
115. 531 F. Supp. at 714.
116. See notes 128-44 infra and accompanying text.
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enforced according to its own terms. The absence of an alternative
forum will be relevant or irrelevant accordingly.
In the case of convenience-based injunctions, however, a closer
analysis is required. The question perhaps is better reformulated as
follows. Ought a court be willing to enjoin foreign country proceedings on account of their vexatiousness or inconvenience when the
claim being asserted in the foreign action cannot be brought anywhere
else? Instinctively, the matter appears again quite analogous to the
conventional forum non conveniens situation. Under Piper,the local
court should not exercise jurisdiction in a case that it otherwise would
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, simply because the law apt
to be applied abroad is less favorable to the local plaintiff. But Piper
does not discourage a court from considering on a forum non conveniens dismissal motion whether the foreign court would recognize
and enforce the action's underlying claim. In fact, the minimal adequacy of the remedy in foreign court-alongside the defendant's submission to the jurisdiction of that court and the court's own
willingness to hear the case-has been widely considered a precondition to forum non conveniens dismissal. Similarly, an American court
should take a close look at its own remedial adequacy with respect to
the cause of action whose pendency abroad is at issue, at least where
the cause of action is not itself deeply offensive to forum public policy
and its prosecution not contrary to a prior obligation on the plaintiff's
part not to sue.
5. Conclusion
While use of the anti-suit injunction as an affirmative forum non
conveniens tool is problematic in the sister-state context,1 17 the case
for using it in that fashion is somewhat stronger in the international
cases. In the first place, most foreign country courts cannot be
expected, consistent with their procedural traditions, to decline jurisdiction on discretionary grounds such as forum non conveniens and
thus themselves police vexatious or oppressive litigation. 8 Moreover, all the inconvenience stakes-like distant travel, foreign law and
language, costs, unfamiliar practices and procedures-are apt to be
higher in the international cases. Nevertheless, the sister-state cases
teach us that convenience-based anti-suit injunctions have a remarkable aptitude for multiplying and for breeding further friction in their
117. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
118. Forum non conveniens dismissal is not an accepted procedural convention outside
the common law world, and is not even uniformly found there. R. Schlesinger, H. Baade, M.
Damaska & P. Herzog, Comparative Law: Cases, Text and Materials 849 n.28 (5th ed. 1988).
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wake. The regularity with which a change of forum in the international arena will mean a corresponding change in applicable law suggests only a heightened potential for conflict over the anti-suit
injunction compared to the sister-state setting, without any obvious
solution. Given the understandable sensitivities involved in assessing
the advantages and inconveniences of foreign litigation, as well as the
absence of any mechanism for containing the recriminations that are
likely to flow from some of those assessments, courts should not
deploy the anti-suit injunction as an affirmative international forum
non conveniens device.
B.

Obligation-BasedAnti-Suit Injunctions
In the situations discussed thus far, a court is faced with the decision whether, in light of the mix of public and private interest factors
present, to prohibit a party before it from pursuing legal action
abroad. In other cases, however, warrant to interfere with foreign
judicial proceedings arises out of a more or less specific obligation by
a party not to sue. An action may have been brought, for example, in
apparent violation of a forum selection clause,' 19 an arbitration

clause lz2 or a prior covenant not to sue. 12 1 Although the jurisdiction
where the forbidden suit is pending would often be an entirely, if not
the most, appropriate forum in which to raise the objection, it is not
necessarily the only suitable forum for doing so.
The case of Omnium Lyonnais d'Etanchditi et Revetement
Asphalte v. Dow Chemical Company 122 provides a less conventional
example of an obligation-based anti-suit injunction. There, a French
national defending an action in federal district court obtained courtordered discovery of material in connection with the litigation on condition that it preserve the confidentiality of that material and, more
particularly, refrain from using it in any other legal proceeding here
or abroad. When the French party then used the documents to
launch a French legal action, the American court issued an injunction
in effect restraining the foreign proceedings. The source of the prohibition was not some judicial appraisal of the overall conveniences and
equities of foreign litigation, but rather a more or less specific prior
119. For an English example, see the Tropaioforos (No. 2), [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 410.
120. For English examples, see Tracomin S.A. v. Sudan Oil Seeds Co. (No. 2), [1983] 1
W.L.R. 1026, [1983] 3 All E.R. 140 (C.A.); Pena Copper Mines v. Rio Tinto Co., [1911-13]
All E.R. 209 (C.A.); Ellerman Lines v. Read, [1928] 2 K.B. 144 (C.A.).
121. E.g., The Tropaioforos (No.2), [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 410. Analogously, a court

might consider enjoining proceedings brought in a foreign country in violation of an arbitration clause. E.g., Tracomin S.A. v. Sudan Oil Seeds (No. 2), [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1026, [1983] 3
All E.R. 140 (C.A.); Pena Copper Mines v. Rio Tinto Co., [1911-1913] All E.R. 209 (C.A.).
122. 441 F. Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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undertaking by the party not to bring the foreign action in the fashion
it did.
Still other reasons, short of an express covenant not to sue or
violation of a court order, may be imagined for treating a party as
under a legally enforceable obligation not to sue, even in another
forum. Under appropriate circumstances, equitable or promissory
estoppel, waiver, and possibly even laches might justify a court having
jurisdiction over a party in restraining it from initiating or continuing
foreign legal proceedings. However, a distinction should be drawn
between the case of a prior and independent obligation not to sue, on
the one hand, and equity-based restrictions on exercise of the right to
sue, on the other. As has been pointed out with respect to the former,
there is simply no basis in conflict of laws for confining actions to
enforce an obligation to perform (or not to perform) an act to the
jurisdiction where that act ought to have been performed (or not performed).12 3 Only considerations of sensitivity to foreign judiciaries-

considerations that are essentially prudential in character-would justify a more restrictive attitude toward the proper venue for enforcement of an undertaking not to sue. By contrast, notions of estoppel,
waiver, laches and the like are most appropriately deployed by the
court in which the litigation is pending that for one of these reasons
arguably ought to be deemed barred. This sort of defense by its
nature-by which I do not mean merely its origins in equity-may
best be assessed by the court that is chiefly concerned with the primary conduct in question (here, the act of litigation) and whether that
conduct should be allowed. Estoppel, waiver and laches, after all,
represent sources of restraint on the otherwise free exercise of a right,
not independent obligations standing in the way. They are best appreciated contextually.
Yet another guise in which an obligation not to sue may surface
is a tort-based claim not to conduct unreasonable or abusive litigation
against someone owed a duty of care. Particularly in the civil law
tradition, torts are often understood as simply one species of breach of
a private law obligation, and the tort remedy as the corresponding
mode of enforcing that species of obligation. Should a court, in a
situation where the allegedly tortious conduct takes the form of litigation, refuse to entertain the claim on the ground that only the forum
where that litigation is pending should be allowed to do so?124 A distinction should be drawn between monetary claims sounding in tort
123. Messner, The Jurisdictionof a Court of Equity over Persons to Compel the Doing of
Acts Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 494 (1929).
124. Judge Wilkey in Laker took the view that while prevention of duplicative litigation
is generally not a sufficient reason for the issuance of anti-suit injunctions, the avoidance of
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on account of damage due to foreign litigation and efforts through
tort law-based reasoning to halt that litigation either at its threshold
or midstream. As to the first, domestic malicious prosecution and
abuse of process cases provide an analogy. Plaintiffs seeking damages
on those grounds have simply not been required to press their claims
in the jurisdiction where the allegedly malicious or abusive litigation
occurred, 125 and there is no reason in logic (though there again may
be reason in international comity) to reach a different result in situations of foreign country as opposed to sister-state litigation. On the
other hand, any tort-based action for the prevention of future detriment would essentially amount to the convenience-based injunctive
action discussed in the previous section, except that somewhat greater
emphasis is apt to be given to the private interest factors, and somewhat less emphasis to the public interest factors, that together influence the "inconvenient forum" analysis.
Considering all the obligation-based postures in which the antisuit injunction issue might arise, it is important to reaffirm a point
made in connection with the convenience-based cases. Ideally, a
court in which judicial proceedings have improperly been brought
will itself decline to exercise jurisdiction, and perhaps that court
should be given the privilege of doing so before foreign courts presume to intervene. Restraint, as the recent Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law makes clear,12 6 is always appropriate when courts issue

injunctions to persons within their jurisdiction respecting conduct to
be performed (or not performed) on foreign soil. An appropriate way
of manifesting that restraint would be to permit a foreign court to
prevent or correct its own errors. Thus, just as a court, before entertaining a motion for an anti-suit injunction, should allow a foreign
forum to decline jurisdiction on its own (at least where that forum
127
legally and practically recognizes forum non conveniens dismissal),
so it should also pursue ways of placing the movant's obligation-based
arguments before the foreign court before definitively addressing them
itself.
As a practical matter, a foreign court may be no more willing to
decline jurisdiction on account of the plaintiff's apparent obligation
not to sue than on account of another country's superiority as a
multiple suits brought solely for purposes of harassment would be a sufficient reason. Laker
Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
125. 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abuse of Process § 13 (1962); 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Malicious Prosecution
§ 13 (1970).
126. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 431, comment d (1987).
127. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
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forum. The foreign court may not even be able, as a legal matter, to
entertain the question. However, the unwillingness or inability of the
foreign court to halt pending proceedings on account of a party's
prior obligation not to have brought them should not prevent another
court with a sufficient interest in the matter from taking appropriate
action. Unlike the convenience-based claims to injunctive relief, these
claims do not in principle reflect adversely on the fairness or reasonableness of the foreign court's exercise of jurisdiction or on its comparative advantages as a forum. Given their independent bases in prior
commitments by the parties, such claims simply do not connote the
intrusiveness and insult to foreign nations to which courts entertaining issuance of international anti-suit injunctions need to be alert.
Besides being generally less inflammatory, they are also much fewer
in number. Ultimately, then, the door should remain open for
issuance of international anti-suit injunctions on obligation-based
grounds.
C. Policy-Based Anti-Suit Injunctions
Although public interest considerations sometimes enter into the
kinds of cases discussed thus far, those situations tend chiefly to raise
issues of convenience, fairness and duties to private parties, rather
than public policy as such. In other situations, however, the public
interest occupies or is said to occupy center stage. These policy-based
cases constitute a third class of situations to which issuance of an antisuit injunction may be an appropriate response.
The request for an anti-suit injunction in these cases rests essentially upon a claim that foreign litigation, whether pending or contemplated, would frustrate an important public policy of the local forum.
Upon closer examination, it frequently turns out that what disturbs
the court is not the offensiveness of the foreign cause of action as such,
or of the likely outcome in a particular case, but rather the belief that
the proceedings have as their purpose and will have as their probable
effect interference with the local court's own prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction. 128 The foreign court's very attempt to defeat the
jurisdiction of the local court, however devoid of public interest the
underlying cause of action in question may be, gives the situation a
high public policy profile. The conflict is heightened when two jurisdictions share a strong interest in regulating a given transnational
activity but seek to prescribe and enforce decidedly different policies
29
respecting it.'
128. See generally Note, Antisuit Injunctions,supra note 5.

129. Id.
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The forum may face several different scenarios. In the starkest of
them, a foreign court may previously have issued an injunction
restraining the local action in the belief that it had a vital and
threatened interest in the outcome. If the forum nevertheless feels
justified as a legal and prudential matter in proceeding, it also may
choose to issue a counter-anti-suit injunction barring any further
party requests for foreign court interference. Such an injunction has
aptly been described as "jurisdiction-protecting" in nature.1 3 In the
American Laker litigation, for example, both Judges Greene and
Wilkey in turn found the very purpose of the airlines' English action
to be frustration of the American antitrust actions then underway,
and thought
issuance of a counter-anti-suit injunction an appropriate
13 1
response.
However, situations may arise in which a foreign court merely
threatens to interfere in some procedural fashion with the local proceedings as, for example, by barring disclosure of documents or testimony by witnesses, 132 rather than seeking to "oust" the local court of
jurisdiction (and therefore generating a self-protective response on the
latter's part). More typically, the foreign court has simply taken jurisdiction over a matter in which the local court believes it has a superior
and conflicting interest. That essentially was the view of the Massachusetts court in Cole v. Cunningham133 upon enjoining the Massachusetts creditors from assigning their claims against the
Massachusetts debtor to a New York party in an effort to secure a
130. Note, InjunctionsAgainst the Prosecutionof Litigation Abroad,supra note 5, at 15657.
131. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 929-31 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Judge Wilkey regarded the English action as "interdictory" in character and, on that
account, the proper target of an American anti-suit injunction. For a sister-state example, see
James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915

(1958).
132. E.g., Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 414, [1986] 3 All E.R. 468 (C.A)
(injunction issued barring depositor from pursuing New York action arising out of bank's
disclosure of documents for use in the British litigation). Cf. Garpeg Ltd. v. United States, 583
F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denial of request by bank for anti-suit injunction requiring
depositor to discontinue foreign proceedings for an order preventing disclosure of documents
for use in American litigation).

Courts do not necessarily regard all unsolicited involvement of foreign courts in pending
litigation as interferences worth enjoining. Where a party to an English action unilaterally
sought judicial assistance from a United States district court in obtaining evidence for use in
the litigation, the English court issued an injunction restraining any further recourse to the
American court. Though upheld on appeal, the injunction was vacated by the House of Lords
on the ground that a foreign court's assistance in evidence-gathering does not constitute a
threat to forum jurisdiction. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij "De Zeven
Provincien" N.V., [1986] 3 W.L.R. 398, [1986] 3 All E.R.487 (H.L.), rev'g [1985] 3 W.L.R.
739, [1985] 2 All E.R. 1046 (C.A.).

133. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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preference that Massachusetts public policy disallowed. It was also
the attitude of the English Court of Appeal in both the Laker and the
Midland Bank cases toward the American antitrust claims in question. The warrant for a court to restrain foreign proceedings in cases
like these clearly will vary according to the strength of the local jurisdiction's interest in precluding resolution of the dispute by the foreign
court. This in turn will depend on the strength of the local jurisdiction's interest in the issue, the superiority of that interest over the
foreign state's interest, and the degree of detriment to the former
should the latter prevail. All of these considerations become folded
into the "local public policy" analysis.
The decision in Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. National Hockey
League 134 offers a case in point. There, the Seattle Totems Hockey
Club had brought a private antitrust action in federal court against
the National Hockey League (NHL), the owners of the Vancouver
NHL team and others, seeking to have the parties' prior agreement
declared void as in violation of American antitrust law. Shortly
thereafter, the owners of the Vancouver team sued the Seattle Totems
in Canada for damages for breach of that agreement. Particularly
since the agreement had been made in Canada and contained a
choice-of-law clause in favor of British Columbian law, the American
court doubted that the Canadian court would apply United States
antitrust law and an anti-suit injunction ensued. Although the court
placed emphasis on the waste of private and public resources in the
parallel proceedings, its chief concern seems to have been frustration
of American antitrust policy. 135
English courts 136 and writers 137 are fond of pointing out that,
unlike the usual convenience-based injunction cases, in which courts
generally compare the suitability of alternative fora, 138 the public policy cases often present a situation in which only one forum-the foreign court-is available for the cause of action in question. The net
effect of an injunction in those circumstances, assuming it is obeyed, is
to prevent the cause of action from being heard altogether. The Mid134. 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
135. Hartley takes the view that British courts under similar circumstances would do
likewise. Hartley, supra note 5, at 510 n.102. However, the most analogous actual case he
could report was one in which a court took jurisdiction over a case, despite the parties' contractual selection of a foreign forum, where it believed mandatory British policy otherwise
would go unenforced. The Hollandia, [1983] A.C. 565. For a comparable American decision,
see Union Ins. Soc. of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981).
136. See, e.g., Midland Bank plc v. Laker Airways Ltd, [1986] 1 All E.R. 526, 534 (C.A.
1985) (Dillon, L.J.).
137. See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 5, at 494.
138. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
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land Bank case again illustrates the situation. The English Court of
Appeal there enjoined Laker from bringing the bank into the pending
American antitrust action in the belief and indeed with the expectation that its antitrust claim against the bank would therefore not be
heard at all.13 9 The English courts are understandably cautioned not
lightly to interfere with foreign judicial proceedings when the cause of
action is incapable of being heard elsewhere." 4
The traditional view expressed in the American cases is that
courts will not consider issuing anti-suit injunctions unless in fact
there are (or could be) parallel local and foreign actions between the
same parties over the same claim.141 In other words, an anti-suit
injunction ought not issue if it would result in depriving the plaintiff
of his or her only remedy. 142 As far as I can tell, American courts
have not yet been tempted to interfere with foreign litigation in situations where the cause of action could not possibly be brought anywhere else. A plausible explanation for the rarity of such cases is in
turn the rarity of foreign causes of action whose intrinsic qualities or
patterns of enforcement our courts find objectionable. Whether the
difference reflects greater restraint in the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction by foreign courts and legislatures or a greater tolerance of
unusual causes of action under foreign law on the part of American
courts is an open question.
The issuance of international anti-suit injunctions for reasons of
forum public policy is altogether much less common than academic
treatments of the subject or the controversy surrounding it might lead
one to believe. The particular celebrity of the Laker and Midland
Bank litigations is due largely, though not only, to their representing
just such a situation. Even Laker, however, must be read closely. It
did not involve a claim that the antitrust policies of the United States
are inherently offensive, but rather that their application to activities
139. The House of Lords in Laker previously had held that English courts lack jurisdiction to determine liability under American antitrust law.
140. See notes 136 and 137 supra and accompanying text.
141. Stein Assoc. v. Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.), aff'g 518 F. Supp. 946, 955
(D. Minn. 1981); Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir.
1969); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 285 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1960); American Home
Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 603 F. Supp. 636, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Garpeg,
Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Minn. 1982); Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 450 F. Supp. 835, 837 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd, 568 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1978).
142. The requirement of actual or potential concurrent proceedings mirrors forum non
conveniens case law. It is well established that a competent court should not decline jurisdiction on grounds of inconvenience unless the more convenient forum is legally and practically
available to the plaintiff.
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allegedly conducted outside the United States would be so acutely
extraterritorial as to offend foreign country sovereignty. Thus, for
Britain, the extraterritorial application of American antitrust law
itself raises a fundamental public policy question, 143 or, as the House
of Lords put it, an "unconscionability" issue."
In sum, American judges would do well to reserve the possibility-to be rarely exercised-of enjoining access of persons within
their jurisdiction to the courts of another nation on fundamental policy grounds. Our courts already exercise the right to deny recognition
or enforcement to foreign country judgments in the name of forum
public policy, even though the Full Faith and Credit Clause allows no
such excuse for discrediting sister-state judgments. 145 Of course, nonrecognition of judgments does much less violence to principles of
international comity than actual interference in foreign judicial proceedings. But that only suggests that the latter step be taken with
even greater caution, deeper reluctance and more extreme rarity than
already attend the former.
VII.

CONCLUSION

A number of conclusions emerge with reasonable clarity from
this inquiry into the international anti-suit injunction. First, the
instrument is becoming an established, if still not very common, judicial tool in the Anglo-American world. Second, use of this instrument in the United States rests upon a history of sister-state
interjurisdictional injunctions that, contrary to its apparent disharmony with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is much older and richer
than might be assumed. The most striking feature of American practice in this regard is the frequency with which the instrument is
deployed as an offensive lis pendens or forum non conveniens tool.
The international anti-suit injunction cases in particular entail a
very striking tension. On the one hand, the stated reasons for issuance of anti-suit injunctions in domestic cases are apt to be even more
143. Midland Bank v. Laker Airways, [1986] 1 All E.R. 526. It is possible that exorbitant exercises ofjurisdiction to adjudicate, like exorbitant exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction,
would trigger the issuance of anti-suit injunctions where deemed necessary to protect a party
from "unconscionable" litigation abroad.
144. Even while vacating the anti-suit injunction issued by the English Court of Appeal
in Laker, the House of Lords made it quite clear that relief of that sort might be proper under
other facts. And of course it was in the wake of the Lords' ruling that the Court of Appeal
later issued an order protecting Midland Bank from suit by Laker in the United States as
necessary to prevent the "unconscionable" prosecution of an English national in American
court through the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law. See note 18 supra
and accompanying text.
145. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
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powerful when applied to judicial restraints on foreign country proceedings. On the other hand, resort by American courts to anti-suit
injunctions in such situations runs deeply counter to the impulses of
mutual consideration and comity that the courts are urged to follow
in international cases. As between these two forces, a policy of
extreme caution in resort to anti-suit injunctions will probably prevail
in the international setting, and applications for such relief will probably meet a correspondingly hostile reception. Nevertheless, in order
to promote a more discriminating judicial attitude toward the international anti-suit injunction it is important to distinguish among the categories of uses for which the remedy is sought and the objectives that
would thereby be served.
Any effort at classification of grounds for injunctive relief is necessarily tentative. Apart from limitations inherent in the typology
itself, judicial policy on so highly charged a matter ought to be
informed not only by abstract principles or reasoning, but by experience and by attention to the particularities of each case. Unfortunately (for purposes of policy formulation, though not for purposes of
international relations), experience with the international anti-suit
injunction is still relatively thin. Although there are signs of stirring
' the precise remedy in question seems
in certain civil law countries, 46
to be confined for the moment to the common law world, in particular
the United Kingdom, Canada147 and the United States.148
American courts rightly reserve the possibility of issuing an
international anti-suit injunction when they understand the central
purpose and effect of a foreign litigation to be frustration of an important public policy of the United States. Assuming that such a policy
may, consistent with jurisdictional principles of international law, be
applied to the case in question, the United States has a legitimate
interest in seeing that its effectuation is not thwarted by the preemptive action of a foreign court. The federal courts in Laker, for example, justifiably issued anti-suit injunctions to various European entities
they had good reason to suppose were about to institute actions whose
avowed object was to neutralize Laker's rights under American antitrust law.
Even where the foreign litigation does not set as its purpose the
frustration of American law or policy, it may be deemed so offensive
to American public policy or so contrary to legitimate American
146. Westin & Chroeziel, ProvisionalRelief in InternationalLitigation: A View from
Germany, 28 Colum. J. Transnatl L. 723 (1990).
147. See Black, The Antisuit Injunction Comes to Canada, 13 Queen's L. J. 103 (1988).
148. The Reporters' note to the latest Restatement provision on the international antisuit injunction cites only the Laker case.
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interests as to invite the same response. Absent a Full Faith and
Credit bond with foreign country judiciaries, and more importantly a
guarantee of public values shared with the polities of which they are
part, the possibility must remain open for American courts to restrain
persons within their jurisdiction from invoking foreign judicial process. Needless to emphasize, American courts should exercise
extreme caution before traveling this particular avenue. It is altogether too easy to suppose that any foreign cause of action that our
courts would refuse to entertain as a matter of forum public policy, or
any judgment to which our courts would deny recognition or enforcement on similar grounds, is one in whose proceedings abroad our
courts have a right upon proper application to interfere. Unfortunately, language in Judge Wilkey's opinion for the Court of Appeals
in Laker lends support to that belief. 149 It would be highly destructive of world public order if national courts acted upon an asserted
freedom to impede foreign judicial proceedings, whether underway or
purely contemplated, on the simple ground that they find them objectionable, even fundamentally so. When acting on international public
policy grounds, American courts as a rule should confine themselves
to decisions about their own procedures and policies-be they matters
of jurisdiction, choice of law or recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments-unless persuaded either that the defeat of American
law is the foreign proceeding's very purpose or that vital American
interests are otherwise in jeopardy. In effect, courts should respect
the distinction between offensive and defensive use, not only of the
more or less technical instruments of lis pendens and forum non conveniens, but also of the forum public policy notion itself.
The request for an anti-suit injunction generally raises very different considerations when based upon a prior and independent obligation of a party not to bring suit in the foreign jurisdiction (or
perhaps anywhere at all). Provided all the requisites of an injunctive
action are present (including personal jurisdiction over the defendant), the institution or continuation of judicial proceedings should be
viewed presumptively as a form of conduct capable of being enjoined
by an American court if done in breach of obligation, albeit outside
the territory of the enjoining court. International comity admittedly
counsels that the court before which the challenged proceedings are
pending itself be given an opportunity to consider and enforce the
alleged obligation not to sue before a foreign court presumes to do so.
More fundamentally, since the injunction is an equitable remedy, its
149. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 931-33 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
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use in any event lies within the sound discretion of the court, and both
the nature and the extraterritoriality of the conduct (here overseas
litigation) may counsel judicial restraint. Nevertheless, if a person's
undertaking not to sue (or not to sue in a particular forum) constitutes an obligation that is legally enforceable, and legally enforceable
in an American court, an international anti-suit injunction should not
be completely ruled out.
Turning finally to the anti-suit injunction based on claims of
inconvenience, vexatiousness or oppression, we encounter the international anti-suit injunction in perhaps its own most vexing form. I
have advanced several reasons for refraining from what I have called
offensive use of the forum non conveniens doctrine. First, unlike the
obligation-based cases, in which the foreign plaintiff's legal entitlement to sue is brought into issue, the convenience-based cases in effect
challenge the fairness and reasonableness of the foreign court's assertion of jurisdiction (in a case, moreover, in which the foreign court
presumably had at least some basis for asserting jurisdiction in the
first place). Such a challenge is inherently offensive to foreign countries. While affirmative use of the forum non conveniens doctrine
may be especially tempting in relation to those many legal systems
around the world that do not allow their courts a forum non conveniens escape from jurisdiction, 150 the fact remains that it is not for
our courts in effect to impose one on them.
Second, unlike the obligation-based and public policy-based antisuit injunctions, those injunctions based on assessments of comparative fairness and convenience are potentially limitless in number. Not
every international lawsuit deeply implicates our own public policy
mandates or offends some prior and independent obligation not to
sue. But virtually every international case is a candidate for parallel
proceedings, as well as forum non conveniens treatment, as evidenced
by the regularity with which defensive forum non conveniens motions
are interposed in international litigation. As long as the doctrine
remains a defensive one, the pattern can perhaps be tolerated. Should
offensive use of the doctrine become similarly routine, however, the
prospect is one of daily international judicial warfare of which the
Laker and Midland cases only gave us a passing glimpse.
Third, offensive use of the forum non conveniens doctrine will
multiply vastly the number of occasions upon which courts must
decide how much weight to give to differences in substantive law and
in remedial adequacy when making assessments of comparative convenience, and will aggravate the climate in which those decisions are
150. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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made. The Supreme Court's Piperdecision did not adequately resolve
the problem of choice of law in the forum non conveniens dismissal
setting, and it is questionable another adequate solution exists. It is
difficult to believe that the problem will prove any more tractable
when it surfaces, as it inevitably must, in convenience-based anti-suit
injunction cases.
Fourth, the possibility is not to be overlooked that a state's resort
to international anti-suit injunctions on grounds of inconvenience or
vexatiousness will be met with a reaction in kind by other states. Significantly, the courts of Great Britain-the foreign jurisdiction showing greatest relish for this form of relief-have directed that remedy
chiefly against United States litigation, and the features of that litigation that have contributed to its targeting are likely to continue into
the future. These features include high damage award levels (including noncompensatory damages), litigation costs and the American
rule on attorneys' fees, delays associated with the civil jury trial and
other aspects of American litigation, and of course extensive pretrial
discovery-the latter being widely viewed abroad as in itself an instrument of oppression. That these features are not always identified as
such by foreign courts as factors of inconvenience and oppression
scarcely means that they are not so considered.
Against these costs must be measured the costs of permitting litigants to pursue judicial remedies in fora that, under the circumstances, appear to have been chosen in whole or in part for their
capacity to inconvenience and otherwise disfavor the defendant, or to
duplicate the expenditure of resources. Although the costs of parallel
proceedings and even the deliberate selection of manifestly inconvenient foreign fora are evils, they are not as evil as the remedy proposed for their cure, even assuming such a cure would be effective.
They are certainly a great deal less evil than the pattern of interjurisdictional judicial warfare that their cure has the potential to launch.
Accordingly, American courts should not only confine the issuance of
international anti-suit injunctions to specific cases where the need for
such relief is truly urgent and compelling, but also confine relief to
those categories of cases that will allow the remedy to remain within
manageable and internationally acceptable bounds.

